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Abstract
The current chapter demonstrates an application of the theoretical framework 
of vertical coordination, more specifically the application of contracting in produc-
tive partnerships, to integrate smallholders into the value chain of a specialised 
crop. The aim of the chapter is to derive implications for industry participants 
on how to integrate smallholders with vertical coordination. Therefore, we take a 
closer look on vertical coordination and contracting in productive partnerships. We 
have taken the value chain of brandy production in Armenia and used the Yerevan 
Brandy Company (YBC) to perform our case study, with which we can analyse ver-
tical coordination mechanisms used by the company. Further, we want to identify 
factors that drive processors and smallholders to enter into contracts. Qualitative 
interviews were conducted with the YBC, their grape suppliers, as well as experts 
from related fields. We analysed the data with a qualitative content approach. 
Results show that the YBC uses different measures of vertical coordination, i.e., 
contracts and farm assistance in the form of consultancy and input supply. The 
company tends to use production contracts rather than pure marketing contracts, 
as it is actively engaged in the production process. The use of contract farming is 
beneficial for both the processing company and the smallholders.
Keywords: value chain, vertical coordination, contracting, smallholders, brandy, 
Armenia
1. Introduction
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the whole food chains in Armenia 
and other Eastern European countries experienced an economic breakdown due to 
the beginning of the transition process. Problems occurred at the beginning of the 
transformation process. After land privatisation, and the liberalisation of prices and 
trades, the prevailing structures did not fit to the open market [1].
Disruption and instability in the supply chain from farmers to retailers had a 
negative impact on qualities and quantities. At the same time, changing consumer 
demands forced retailers and processors to adjust and improve the structure of the 
food chains to meet consumer demands and to overcome the supply problems. The 
agricultural policy could not provide frameworks and institutions fast enough to 
restructure the food commodity chains to guarantee stable and higher qualities as 
well as quantities. As a consequence, retailers and processors were engaged mainly in 
the approach of private-driven vertical coordination with partners along the supply 
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chain to overcome the problems of supply disruption and minor quality [2, 3]. These 
structural changes and their consequences are still present today.
To adapt to the new environment, the Yerevan Brandy Company (YBC), the pro-
ducer of Ararat brandies, was acquired by the international Pernod Ricard Group 
with French origin in 1998, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Investments of foreign companies can cause structural changes in the agri-food 
sector. The requirements of the newly established procurement systems demand 
that suppliers can guarantee both disruption-free product flows and delivery of 
products of a certain quality, thus forcing domestic producers to keep up with 
quantity and quality demands to prevent the import of products [4].
Literature on the influence of foreign direct investment (FDI) on transition 
economies mentions several positive effects of FDI such as follows: (1) it facilitates 
economic growth [5, 6], (2) it reduces poverty [7, 8], and (3) it can induce technol-
ogy transfer, technical innovation as well as enterprise restructuring [7]. Dyker 
points out that those investing companies have to impose their corporate organisa-
tional structures on subsidiaries or partners [9]. Those organisational structures are 
based on the disposition of hierarchies, lines of responsibility, the use of intra-firm 
e-mail systems, etc. Hanf et al. show the influence that foreign investors have taken 
in the development of the Armenian wine and brandy business. They use different 
Armenian companies, among others, the YBC [10].
This is why we take the YBC as a case study to show exemplarily how an interna-
tional company manages to integrate local smallholders (grape growers) into their 
national and international value chains by successfully installing a procurement 
system by using different measures of vertical coordination.
The case of the YBC in the Armenian brandy industry can be seen as a bench-
mark example for other countries and their agricultural sectors where the structure 
of smallholders is still prevailing, too. Based on the case study, we derive implica-
tions for the participants.
The chapter is structured as follows. To show the theoretical background on 
integration of smallholders into value chains, the next chapter gives an overview 
about vertical coordination, and vertical coordination mechanisms, i.e., contracting 
in productive partnerships.1 In the third chapter, background information on the 
Armenian wine industry is provided. The fourth chapter presents the case study 
results from the Yerevan Brandy Company. Finally, concluding remarks are offered.
2.  Integration of smallholders into the value chain: vertical coordination 
and contracting
2.1 Vertical coordination
In everyday business, companies face decisions about the synchronisation 
of successive stages in the marketing channel from producers to consumers. 
Traditionally either spot market transactions or integrated processes in companies 
have been used. The spot market and vertical integration can be considered as clas-
sical modes, which continue to be applied in nowadays businesses.
The spot market represents the classic buy (on the market) decision, where 
the company organises the transaction directly on the market. That means, the 
company buys, for example, an input on the market place. In this case, individual 
1 The theoretical frame is mainly based on the published chapter “Integration of Small Farmers into 
Value Chains: Evidence from Eastern Europe and Central Asia” [11]. For a detailed review on vertical 
coordination, look into Hanf and Gagalyuk [11].
3Including Smallholders with Vertical Coordination
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.92395
economic actors follow their self-interest and focus on short-term, opportunistic 
exchange relationships, in which the individual actors can preserve their indepen-
dence and high flexibility [12].
Vertical integration is considered to be the make (inside the company) deci-
sion, which means that a company integrates a successive stage, which can be an 
upstream or a downstream process. Hence, vertical integration combines different 
levels of the value chain within one firm [11]. Internal, intra-firm transactions 
replace various market transactions. This can be achieved either by forming a 
subsidiary or by a merger or acquisition. In vertically integrated firms, management 
directives dictate the transfer of resources across stages [2].
The classic make vs. buy decision has been researched quite well. Based on 
Coase’s work about boundaries of a firm that make the difference whether compa-
nies choose to make or buy the product [13], Williamson [14] was one of the first 
to speak about hybrid governance structures. Based on the previous research made 
on the topic of hybrid coordination strategies and hybrid governance structures, 
Peterson et al. have highlighted the hybrid strategies and the nature of the so-called 
vertical coordination continuum. Depending on the type of vertical transaction, 
firms decide between the spot market, vertical coordination (productive partner-
ships) and vertical integration [12, 15] Vertical integration combines different levels 
of the value chain within one firm [11]. Internal, intra-firm transactions replace 
various market transactions. This can be achieved either by forming a subsidiary 
or by a merger or acquisition. In vertically integrated firms, management directives 
dictate the transfer of resources across stages [2].
Vertical coordination can be described as the synchronisation of successive 
stages in the marketing channel from producers to consumers, leaving out spot 
market transactions, where the commodity exchange is only based on pricing. 
Productive partnerships, a kind of vertical integration, are characterised by col-
laborations of independent firms, in which the partners share interests as well as 
knowledge and resources to improve the outcomes of the supply chain activity. 
Productive partnerships can be based on specification contracts (production and 
marketing contracts2), relational-based alliances and equity-based alliances [12]. It 
can take different organisational forms possible: from loose or tacit agreements to 
stable, long-term and trust-based cooperation contracts [14, 17].
One can assume that the higher the priority to secure quality and/or quantity 
of raw materials, the stronger is the shift from spot market transactions towards 
advanced vertical coordination mechanisms [18]. This is closely related to the inten-
sity of control, which increases along the continuum (Figure 1). With spot markets, 
the intensity of control is low, as exchange partners decide on whether to realise 
the transaction or not. With specification contracts, the control increases from 
that related to spot markets. As in relation-based alliances, involved firms share 
risks and benefits; coordination control arises from mutual interests and decision-
making. In equity-based alliances, the intensity of control is even higher, because 
partners are key stakeholders and control and decision-making are decentralised 
among the ownership parties. Examples for equity-based alliances are cooperatives 
and joint ventures [12, 15].
2.2 Contracting in productive partnerships
The key for all types of vertical coordination is contracting. Vertical coordina-
tion aims to overcome the disruptions in supply and inferior-quality products. 
However, the key actors (retailers and processors) find themselves constrained not 
2 For an overview on different classifications of agricultural contracts, see Drescher [16].
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by their capital capacity but by that of other participants along the chains on which 
they depend for critical inputs. This is because traditional lending institutions such 
as banks do not give credit to enhance the inter-firm product flow. Contract farming 
can be defined as an agreement between legally independent firms for the produc-
tion of a commodity or product for a future market [16]. Götz et al. state: “An 
essential element of contract farming is the provision of some degree of assistance 
to the farmers, with the aim of increasing supply quantity or quality, or reducing 
seasonality” ([19], p. 364). Overall, farm assistance can include input supply pro-
grammes, investment assistance, trade credits, bank loan guarantees, extension and 
management advisory services, etc [4]. Thus, farm assistance programmes must be 
accompanied by appropriate governance mechanisms.
Production contracts (resource-providing contracts) are predominantly used to 
address quality concerns [20]. Developed markets have various consumer segments 
with differentiated demands. In production contracts, the contractor provides, on 
the one hand, a market for the goods and, on the other hand, engages in many of the 
producer’s decisions and retains ownership of essential production inputs to secure 
higher-quality products to attend to the differentiated demands of the consumer 
segments [21]. However, when the higher-quality products become standardised 
(e.g. IFS or GlobalGAP certified) and there are no supply difficulties and/or the 
overall product quality is not complex, mainly marketing contracts will be used.
Marketing contracts address only the issue of supply disruptions by private 
contractual initiatives [22, 23]. The contractor usually provides a market for the 
goods but—on the contrary to production contracts—engages in few or none of 
the producer’s decisions. In marketing contracts, the contractor and producer may 
negotiate the delivery schedule, pricing method and product characteristics.
For both types of contracts, Swinnen states that “these private contract initia-
tives can be quite substantial” ([2], p. 1). Empirical evidence indicates that they 
include farm management assistance, extension services, quality controls, farm 
input assistance programmes, trade credits and even bank loan guarantees. The 
programmes generate essential improvements in the credit situation of the farms, 
as they contribute directly to improved access to finance (e.g. through trade credit) 
and indirectly as they improve contracting farms’ access to loans from banks or 
external financial institutions (through loan guarantees, enhanced farm profit-
ability and improved future cash flows). Summing up, there are different factors 
influencing participants towards contract arrangements.
The main reason why processors enter into contracts includes the control over 
input supply. Further, processors use contracts to achieve uniformity and predict-
ability to suit consumers, but they also benefit from lower costs in processing, 
packing and grading [24–27].
The main motivating factors for farmers to enter into contracts are the follow-
ing, as reported by the USDA (1996): (I) income stability (to reduce risk compared 
Figure 1. 
Framework vertical coordination (based upon [12]).
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to other ways of selling on traditional marketing channels); (II) improved effi-
ciency (management decisions are transferred to the farmers); (III) market security 
(entering the contract provides a certain security in that the product will be sold if it 
meets with the requirements); and (IV) access to capital (contractor often provides 
inputs for farmers, which reduces the usage of credits) [28].
However, two reasons for the breaching of contracts have been detected. First, 
a lack of trust in business relations between producers and their buyers, as in 
transition countries, many buyers experienced that businesses were not able to 
pay. According to Ring and Van de Ven, trust is not built based on contracts; it 
rather emerges over time due to the commitment of assets or satisfactory perfor-
mance [29].
Second, they may not be able to fulfil a contract because they cannot access 
basic production factors [23]. Contract enforcement is still an important problem. 
In the World Bank study, the enforcement problem was regarded as one of the 
most important barriers for successful vertical coordination [4]. However, in some 
cases, public enforcement institutions are not fully functioning. Furthermore, since 
transition countries are often described as having limited social capital, there is also 
an absence of societal enforcement mechanisms (e.g. peer or community pressure, 
a sense of mutual obligation and an overall sense of distrust). Thus, to improve the 
farmer’s access to basic production factors (capital and specific inputs) and know-
how/information (knowledge and experience), means have to be worked out and 
put down in writing, i.e., contracts have to be signed [4].
The change to modern procurement systems is one reason for initiating vertical 
coordination and, therefore, chain-based financing. The requirements set by these 
systems favour large-scale farm production for two purposes: (1) significantly fewer 
large suppliers are needed, and hence the complexity of the system is lowered, 
which decreases transaction costs, and (2) it is more costly to assist small farms 
than larger farms [4]. As a result, many retailers and processors would like to see 
growth in farm size.
However, retailers and processors are (still) forced to include smallholders. 
Smallholders are essential for ensuring the required quantities in some countries. 
Particularly in labour-intensive sectors, small-scale farming has significant cost 
Figure 2. 
Contracting in productive partnerships.
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advantages. If the (farm) suppliers get too large, they begin to recapture some 
power. Since larger farms have the feeling that they can survive just by themselves, 
it may be more likely that smaller farmers join horizontal collaborations and ulti-
mately create much larger units. The degree of market development is essential for 
the degree of vertical coordination. The less a market and its institutional environ-
ment are developed, the less likely it is that a complex system of vertical coordina-
tion will emerge (where marketing contracts are dominant). The more developed 
a market (i.e. the greater the demand for higher-quality products), the higher the 
degree of vertical coordination will be, and production contracts are favoured. 
These contracts vary in control allocation and risk transformation across stages.
Figure 2 sums up the elements of contracting in productive partnerships.
3. Background information: Armenian wine industry
During the communist era, the satellite countries were divided to focus on the 
production of particular products. Therefore, Armenian table wine production 
was shifted mainly to brandy production, which led to a significant change in the 
Armenian wine culture. Other countries, such as Georgia and Moldova, were focusing 
on wine production, which preserved the wine culture within these countries [30].
The production area has gone through a tremendous decline after a very peak in 
1985 with 35,000 ha (~88.4 million litres). During the Soviet times, Armenia pro-
cessed more than 200,000 tons of grapes mostly for brandy, a little bit of wine and 
sparkling wine. The major part of the production was consumed in Russia and the 
empire of the Soviet Union. Especially the anti-alcohol campaign in 1985 initiated 
by Michail Gorbatschow had an enormous influence on the area until the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991 [31]. His goal was to improve the Soviet morale, to reduce 
the expenses and deaths due to high alcohol consumption. Many old vineyards were 
cut off or removed to reduce the production of alcoholic beverages [32]. Figure 3 
gives an overview of the wine production from 1971 to 2017.
In the post-Soviet period, the grape-growing industry declined heavily in 
Armenia and other Soviet countries, and so did the wine sector due to changes in 
Figure 3. 
Wine production (incl. base wine for brandy) in million litres in Armenia from 1971 to 2017 annually (based 
upon [33, 34]).
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land privatisation. Other influencing factors were the absence of replantation of 
vineyards and the shift of some farmers to other more profitable crops [1]. Triggered 
by the lack of productivity, outdated machinery and issues in bulk purchasing 
systems, problems of adaption to new emerging markets occurred. All these issues 
led to a drastic rise in terms of vine cultivation costs [31, 35]. Some producers 
terminated their production ultimately or shifted to new industries. Since the early 
1990s (with an interruption due to the financial crisis), the grape-growing sector 
slowly has recovered in terms of production numbers, mainly because of an upswing 
in the brandy sector.
For brandy production, mainly white grape varieties, which can deliver higher 
yields and sugar levels (to obtain higher alcohol content for brandy making), are 
cultivated. Those varieties are less suitable for table wine production. Red variet-
ies are mostly used for table wine production, where, in addition to sugar level, 
healthiness and other quality aspects such as ripeness, acidity and pH level are more 
important. Therefore, prices between red and white grapes are tremendously differ-
ent—white grapes receive overall lower payments [1].
Producers purchase mostly grapes from small rural households with small 
average sizes of grape-growing units leaving the grape growers in a weak spot 
for bargaining. According to Hanf et al., most of the grape-buying agreements 
(besides YBC contracts) in the wine and brandy industry are based on quantity 
and trust [10]. They do not include quality criteria. Currently, informal, 1-year 
oral agreements are usually closed before harvest, but mostly repetitive during the 
years. The case of not observed contracts was also found in Armenia and has led to 
mistrust [10].
In 2017, overall, 66,544 farmers cultivated grapes in an average plot size of 
0.23 ha [36]. Due to their plot sizes, many smallholders cannot manage to finance 
their winemaking facilities and/or get access to the market to sell the high-valued 
final product. That is why farmers are heavily dependent on their grape sales to 
a few operating production plants such as wineries or brandy factories [1]. The 
dependence on grape sale for smallholders is still high, as it is the primary source of 
rural income.
4. The case study: Yerevan brandy company
The YBC is (still) the leading brandy-producing enterprise of Armenia. 
Currently, the YBC has around 2500 private farmers delivering grapes to the com-
pany on a contract basis. It produces a range of brandies of different ages. The brand 
Ararat belongs to the company. The YBC exports up to 90% of the production to 
33 countries worldwide. The primary export destination is Russia. The company 
comprises four production sites, in three grapes are received, the juice is fermented, 
and the interim product (wine) is distilled. In all four sites, the distillate is aged. The 
fourth site is in Yerevan, where the ageing, blending and bottling facilities as well 
as other divisions such as HR, IT, accountancy and administration are situated. The 
YBC has branches in Ararat, Armavir and Tavush.
To gain insights into the production structures, operational procedures and 
business relationship to the smallholders which supply grapes to the company, a 
qualitative research approach was chosen. Qualitative research is dedicated to a 
limited number of cases that are investigated as precisely as possible. Therefore, 
face-to-face individual interviews were conducted with different industry 
participants. Besides representatives of the company itself, we interviewed 
smallholders (grape producers) and industry experts from politics and educa-
tion as well as experts from foreign help organisations, e.g. Deutsche Gesellschaft 
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für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Center for Agribusiness and Rural 
Development (CARD), Centre for the Promotion of Imports (CBI) from develop-
ing countries, etc. Additionally, we interviewed the director of the Vine and Wine 
Foundation of Armenia, who represents all grape growers and processors in the 
industry. Regarding the company’s perspective, we interviewed the heads of grape 
purchasing and quality control at the YBC and two of the YBC agronomists, who 
work directly together with the farmers in the vineyards. Moreover, we conducted 
interviews with 15 smallholders who have a contract with the company. To cover all 
production sites of the YBC, we have interviewed five farmers from each region. 
Some of the farmers have worked with the YBC for many years, and others have 
just recently started the collaboration. Interviews are based on a semi-structured 
interview guideline and were carried out by the authors personally. The interviews 
took place between May 2018 and January 2020. The interviews were conducted 
in Armenian and then translated into English to guarantee full exploitation of 
information.
For the qualitative analysis of the interviews, the approach of Gläser and 
Laudel [37] was used. They use a method called extractive qualitative content 
analysis. It is based on a structuring technique to extract relevant and complex 
information during the whole process. The process is completely open for new and 
unexpected information. After the information is extracted from the original text 
material (transcribed interviews), the information is processed and analysed.
The case study of the YBC shows how an international company manages to 
integrate local smallholders (grape growers) into their national and international 
value chains by using means of vertical coordination in the form of contracting. 
Moreover, the case study demonstrates how a procurement system can be installed 
successfully in a weak institutional setting. The YBC was the first company in 
Armenia to introduce the contracting system between the grape growers and 
processors in 2003. Later it was recognised by the government as an exemplary one.
After the Yerevan Brandy Company became part of the Pernod Ricard Group 
in 1998, an internal restructuring process has taken place to tackle the issues of the 
brandy industry and to align them with the international standards of the markets. 
Main changes were carried out in infrastructure, refurbishment, huge investments 
specifically in winemaking facilities and distilleries were made, but the most 
important changes were made in business management. The introduction of the 
first written, enforceable and long-term contracts changed the standards of the 
wine and brandy industry in Armenia.
The main reason why the YBC entered into contracting was to ensure sustain-
able grape supply in terms of quantity. To secure the needed quantity, the company 
has to purchase all their grapes from independent grape growers, as the YBC does 
not possess a large area of own vineyards except for 0.5 ha of trial vineyard. The 
company is forced to include smallholders to ensure the required quantity.
The contract, which is set up between the company and the grape growers, 
contains specifically the grape quantity, variety, contract length, characteristics of 
the plot where the grapes are grown and a few quality criteria such as the healthi-
ness of the grapes and the minimum sugar level. One interviewed grape grower 
mentioned, for instance: “It is required to deliver healthy grapes. The delivered 
quantity should contain the smallest possible amount of material other than grapes 
(e.g. leaves, stones). The contract also includes the grape varieties which can be 
delivered to the company”. The guaranteed quantity enables grape growers to 
plan in terms of income, input supplies and production. Through the long-lasting 
approach (3–5 years of contracting), trust is built between both parties. As one 
interview partner said: “For me it’s not only the profit that matters. Most important 
is the long-term collaboration with the YBC, as it gives me a feeling of stability”.  
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The interviewed farmers stated that the duration of the long-term contracts in the 
past was even 7 years.
Furthermore, the contract includes terms of payments and delivery (e.g. number 
and time of payments). All types of contracts include minimal prices. The company 
philosophy aims to purchase grapes at a price above the farmer’s production cost, 
which is company-wide evaluated before harvest.
In general, the price is announced in spring, which gives farmers the possibility 
to decide what to do. However, in some exceptional years (e.g. 2018) pricing details 
can vary, so the YBC announces the updated price before the harvest. As prices 
are included in the contracts and the contracts are legally enforceable, neither the 
farmer nor the YBC can negotiate on prices after the contract has been set up.
An annex of the contract takes into account the potential deviation from the 
contractual agreements due to quantity fluctuations. In August, shortly before the 
harvest starts, the YBC agronomists visit the vineyards and calculate the potential 
yield. If weather conditions were unfavourable and the farmer could not obtain the 
required quantity (or, in turn, the yield is higher than expected), the agronomists 
and farmers can fix the required quantity according to the situation. A grape 
grower stated: “The yield is always predicted by the agronomists beforehand. 
Depending on year the quantities can be higher or lower, but it is negotiable by the 
contract annex”.
Ten agronomists are working at the YBC doing quality control within the 
contracted vineyards to provide consultancy to the farmers. One of the farmers, for 
instance, said: “There was a time we were implementing old cultivation methods 
damaging our crop. In the beginning it was difficult to change our mind-set and fol-
low the instructions of the YBC agronomists. Time proved the effectiveness of their 
consultancy so we became more open to their suggestions, even more motivated 
to find out new information, learn new cultivation technologies”. The consultancy 
includes good agricultural practices such as pruning, canopy management, spray-
ing times with herbicides/pesticides, greenings, etc. Additionally, the agronomists 
also conduct monitoring to make sure that the expected grape quality and yield 
are going to be received. Based on the evaluation of the agronomists, the company 
subsidises smallholders with farm input assistance—if needed—with pesticides, 
herbicides and fertilisers. Another grape grower mentioned: “The company pro-
vides tools, sprayers, and pesticides at convenient prices. The payment for these 
inputs is directly taken out from the pay-out we receive for the delivered grapes”.
To provide knowledge and new techniques, the YBC owns 0.5 ha of experimen-
tal plots for trials. For instance, in 2006 the company started some trials on their 
experimental plots together with the Pernod Ricard research centre, to demonstrate 
their grape suppliers that new cultivation methods in the grape production can be 
less time-consuming and more profitable.
For smallholders, the main motivating factors to enter into contracts with the 
YBC are based on the benefits the farmers receive from working with the company. 
The YBC provides constant market access for grapes and gives the smallholders a 
guarantee of grape purchase. Farmers who do not breach the contract have a stable, 
reliable and almost predictable profit/income. The long-term relationship between 
the company and the farmers offers the opportunity to build trust between the con-
tracting parties. This increases reliability between them and gives income security 
to the farmers. Besides some 1-year contracts, mostly 3–5 years of contract length 
(if there is no contract breach), are used. Another advantage is that grape delivery 
and payments are scheduled ahead; hence, no price negotiations of the YBC are 
possible if the farmer meets the contract requirement due to legal enforcement. 
The company provides farm assistance in the form of inputs (chemicals, fertilisers, 
etc.) and consultancy (pruning, irrigation, spraying times, dosage and frequency, 
Agricultural Economics
10
etc.), if necessary. Farmers have access to knowledge and new techniques through 
the YBC. Grape producers also benefit from working with the YBC because they are 
delivering high-quality grapes for high-quality brandy production and thus benefit 
of the company’s reputation.
One of the smallholders, for example, said as a concluding remark: “My father 
and I were practicing grape cultivation ever since land privatisation in Armenia. 
We had a small plot and low quantities. Slowly, gaining experience in this field, 
our expectations rose, and at the same time, the vineyard territories expanded, 
especially in the period when PR bought the YBC and we started collaboration. The 
organizational skills of the company positively surprised us from the very begin-
ning. It was the first time in Armenia, when the farmer delivers the grapes without 
being stuck in huge queue. Everything was planned with a contract”.
If it comes to the credit situation of the smallholders, the YBC is not help-
ing them directly by providing loans, loan guarantees or trade credits. However, 
smallholders who work with the YBC over a longer period increase their chances to 
get a credit or loan at external institutions because of the fixed, long-term contracts 
with the YBC and, hence, a stable and enhanced profitability or improved future 
cash flows based on their past performances. This provides security to external 
institutions, improving the probability for smallholders to finance investments. 
One statement of an interviewed grape grower was: “Having larger vineyards, one 
always needs financial support to do investments in, for example, the trellising sys-
tem (metal wires, etc.). Recently I expanded my vineyard and needed a bank loan. 
When applying for the loan the bank considers your current economic situation 
as well as where you are trading your product. Seeing our contract with a serious 
company such as the YBC, the bank never rejects the application”. In this setting, the 
YBC helps indirectly with access to capital.
In case a farmer cannot deliver the settled quality and/or quantity of grapes 
to the YBC, the contract is breached. Additionally, the competition among small-
holders to work with the YBC is huge, creating societal pressure to follow the 
restrictions.
The contract design, as mentioned above, shows that the YBC is on the one hand 
working with marketing contracts to secure grape quantities and qualities for their 
brandy production. In general, the brandy production itself does not require highly 
differentiated grapes. Grape quality is mainly defined by a minimum sugar level 
and a minimum of the healthiness of grapes close to the harvest. However, the YBC 
sets up higher-quality restrictions. For instance, the company only purchases high-
level healthy grapes (pest-free, disease-free, no foreign bodies, etc.) and certain 
grape varieties. The YBC does not purchase all grape varieties which can be used for 
brandy production.
In contrast to that, grape production for wine is more differentiated, and quality 
is also defined by sugar and healthiness, but it includes further grape characteristics 
such as colour, tannins and sugar and acid ratios. However, if we consider on the 
other hand the provided farm input assistance in the form of chemicals, fertilisers, 
etc. and the consultancy, e.g., pruning, irrigation and spraying times, this depicts a 
high involvement during the production process. The YBC actively engages in many 
critical decisions within the production process, adding production contract features.
Further interviews with some producers of table wine and experts from related 
fields such as education, politics and related fields/companies were conducted 
additionally. The interviews revealed that after the successful implementation of 
contracts in the brandy sector, many table wine producers followed. One of the 
experts stated: “Most of the time grape purchases for table wine were based on 
customary rearrangements. In that area a very well developed relationship, only one 
company has. This is Yerevan Brandy Company, having written contracts with their 
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farmers. In this sense, Yerevan Brandy was a role model”. Another expert added 
that within the last years, a steady increase in contracts in the grape purchase was 
notable. Overall, the influence of the YBC in the brandy and wine sector of Armenia 
was shown.
Figure 4 sums up the results of vertical coordination mechanisms used in the 
productive partnerships of the YBC and the grape growers.
5. Conclusion
As a result of land privatisation which was part of the transition process, the 
average plot sizes of farmers are small. In 2017, overall, 66,544 farmers cultivated 
grapes in an average plot size of 0.23 ha. Due to their plot sizes, many smallholders 
cannot manage to finance their winemaking facilities and/or get access to the mar-
ket to sell the high-valued final product, resulting in a high dependency of small-
holders on grape sales to processors. In this context, the aim was to show how to 
integrate smallholders into national and international value chains by successfully 
installing a procurement system in weak institutional environments. In our case 
study of the Yerevan Brandy Company, we found that the company uses specifica-
tion contracts as one type of vertical coordination, where independent individuals 
or firms of different stages in the value chain decide to collaborate. Currently, 
the YBC has around 2500 private farmers delivering grapes to the company on 
a contract basis. In order to avoid the disruptions in supply and inferior quality, 
the company introduced contracting from the early beginning. As a result, major 
disruptions in quantity and quality never occurred.
In 1998, Pernod Ricard Group bought the Yerevan Brandy Company, the most 
important Armenian brandy-producing company known by its Ararat brandy. This 
was when the first contracts between producers and smallholders were introduced. 
The YBC serves as a role model for other post-Soviet countries with similar issues 
up to the present.
Introducing the contracting system Yerevan Brandy Company reached a syn-
chronisation of successive stages in the vertical marketing channel from producers 
Figure 4. 
Results of vertical coordination in the YBC case study.
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to consumers to overcome problems of supply and quality. The YBC is taking 
different measures regarding vertical coordination. For example, the company uses 
mostly 3- to 5-year contracts, which include specifications of the grape quantity, 
variety, contract length, characteristics of the plot where the grapes are grown and 
a few quality criteria such as the healthiness of the grapes and the minimum sugar 
level. This shows that the YBC uses production contracts rather than pure market-
ing contracts. The company also offers farm assistance in the form of consultancy 
of YBC agronomists who closely work together with the farmers in the vineyards 
and in the form of input supply. Agronomists provide consultancy for viticultural 
practices, special viticultural issues, measures to take if yields are lower or higher 
than expected and input supply. The example of the YBC also shows that foreign 
direct investment not only brings capital, production facilities and technology 
transfers but also creates employment, provokes new job skills and offers manage-
ment expertise.
The business environment in Armenia should embrace and reduce the obstacles 
for foreign companies to make investments in Armenia. This opens the opportunity 
for domestic producers to benefit financially, knowledge- and technology-wise, 
access to export markets as well as in business management from foreign direct 
investments.
In addition, the legal framework has to be improved to guarantee the enforce-
ment of contracts and oral agreements. Especially grape growers, who are in a weak 
bargaining spot, would benefit from a legal improvement. Furthermore, NGOs or 
the ministry of agriculture could provide contract templates to reduce the numbers 
of oral agreements, as the legal setting for written contracts is more developed and 
enforcement exists.
The study finds that the institutional arrangements used in Armenia in the 
form of contract farming as part of vertical coordination are beneficial for both the 
processing company and the smallholders. In these contracts, the farmers agree to 
produce and supply agreed quantities of grapes. The study could not find any dis-
advantage for smallholders in terms of contract farming. In contrast, farmers who 
have a contract with the YBC benefit of secured market access, secured and stable 
income, access to bank loans, education, farm assistance in the form of consultancy 
or input supply.
For farmers who are not working with the YBC, a general recommendation is a 
higher financial support from the government or other institutions, which would 
help to ease their situation. The financial support in forms of credits or loans 
enables the grape growers to invest into more demanded varieties (e.g. red grapes 
for table winemaking) or even into other crops (e.g. lemons, peaches) which are 
more profitable.
Another option to support smallholders is the establishment of cooperatives. 
Cooperatives are beneficial for smallholders, as the bundling of quantities improves 
their bargain situation and knowledge—as well as investment—sharing is possible. 
The delivered grapes can be divided into quality categories, which then can be sold 
in different price segments to different market participants. The offer of differenti-
ated quality levels with different prices leads to higher overall profits. Farmers 
who produce high-quality grapes gain higher patronage, giving an incentive for 
high-quality production. If wine or brandy producers need grapes or wine, they can 
bargain with the cooperative as a single entity for their needed quality category, and 
they do not have to bargain with many farmers to gain the same quantity.
All in all, the YBC manages to integrate smallholders (grape growers) into their 
national and international value chains by successfully installing a procurement 
system by using different measures of vertical coordination. Additionally, the YBC 
contributed to the development of the sector. Other companies start to adapt and 
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take the YBC as a role model. In future, the standards set by the YBC and the ongo-
ing development (education, knowledge, experience, etc.) will improve the perfor-
mance of many farmers and equalise the produced qualities on the market. Sugar 
levels, healthiness of the grapes and usage of certain grape varieties become basic 
quality requirements. When the higher-quality products become standardised (e.g. 
IFS or GlobalGAP certified), mainly marketing contracts will be used. Thus, in the 
long run, it can be assumed that the degree of vertical coordination will decrease 
and the contracts will further tend towards pure marketing contracts. However, in 
the short and medium term, the adjustment will assumingly be rather slow.
© 2020 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited. 
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